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LET CHARITABLE DIRECTORS DIRECT: WHY TRUST LAW
SHOULD NOT CURB BOARD DISCRETION OVER A CHARITABLE
CORPORATION'S MISSION AND UNRESTRICTED ASSETS
ROBERT A. KATZ*
INTRODUCTION
People organize and contribute to charities in order to pursue particu-
lar charitable objectives. Each charity's governing body also pursues chari-
table objectives, but these are not necessarily the same as those of the
charity's organizers or contributors. Sometimes, this gap between the ob-
jectives of a charity's philanthropists (i.e., organizers, donors, and volun-
teers) and its "philanthropoids" (i.e., the trustees of a charitable trust, the
directors or officers of a charitable corporation, etc.) represents a failure of
accountability, as when a charity uses a restricted gift in ways that violate
the donor's explicit instructions. The legal form most closely associated
with the "follow-the-philanthropist's" conception of accountability is the
charitable trust, which arises when a donor (a.k.a. "settlor") executes a
written instrument directing the trustee to use the donated property for a
specific charitable purpose.
Other times, it is harder to determine whether a gap exists between the
philanthropists' and philanthropoids' charitable objectives, and, if so,
whether the gap represents a failure or fulfillment of accountability's de-
mands. This may be the case in some charitable corporations that are
funded mainly by "unrestricted" gifts.' If the corporate board amends its
charitable purposes, does it break faith with the donors of unrestricted gifts
* Associate Professor of Law and Philanthropic Studies, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis; J.D., University of Chicago, 1992; A.B,, Harvard College, 1987. My deepest thanks to
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1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) ("An outright devisee or donation
to a ... charitable institution, expressly or impliedly to be used for its general'purposes ... does not
create a trust as that term is used in this Restatement."),
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(a.k.a. "general donors") if it applies their gifts to those amended pur-
poses? 2 Or is there a "competing narrative" so to speak-that the board acts
responsibly by attempting "to keep the purpose of the charity current and
useful," 3 and by redirecting its unrestricted assets to purposes that "the
board perceives to be... more socially useful"? 4 Does the board act re-
sponsively to general donors, who may have structured their gifts so as to
enable the board to respond to changing needs and new opportunities?
Lastly, what does the concept of accountability mean for a nonmem-
bership 5 charitable corporation that relies mainly on nondonated sources of
revenue, such as "earned income and investment income (other than on
gifts)"?6 One might say the entity is accountable insofar as it does not stray
from the statement of charitable purposes set forth in the articles of incor-
poration, 7 but that may not be saying much. The modem trend in nonprofit
corporate law has been to accord corporation boards extensive-if not ple-
nary-authority to redefine the organization's charitable objectives 8 and to
use the organization's resources (with the exception of restricted gifts) to
advance those new objectives. 9 This trend reflects a broader policy of"cor-
porate law parallelism."10 This policy seeks to pattern nonprofit corporate
2, Compare Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs., § 245 rptr's note 2 (Coun-
cil Draft No. 1, Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1] ("[T]hese Princi-
ples do not prohibit unrestricted pre-amendment assets [including pre-amendment unrestricted gifts]
from being used for the new purpose."), with Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011,
1021 (Mass. 1986) (stating that although corporate board can change its charitable purpose by amend-
ing its articles of incorporation, pre-amendment restricted gifts nmy not be used for the new purpose).
3. ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 240 gen. cmts.
4. Id. § 240 rptr's note 13 (discussing state nonprofit hospital conversion statutes that "curtail the
[corporate board's] freedom ... to liquidate its assets and redeploy the proceeds to what its board
perceives to be a more socially useful purpose").
5. In a membership nonprofit corporation, there are persons entitled to vote for the election of a
director or directors. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 1.40(21) (1987). These electors (a.k.a.
"members") are typically "those persons for whose benefit the corporation operates." Id. § 6.10 cmt. In
a nonmembership nonprofit corporation, by contrast, the directors typically select their own successors,
a.k.a. a "self-perpetuating" board, and are not formally answerable to any stakeholder or group of
stakeholders. Id- § 8.04.
6. ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 245 gen. cmts.
7. Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive
Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 205, 208, 212-13 (2004) (explaining that to be
deemed accountable, a nonprofit organization must, inter alia, adhere to its mission as set forth in its
organic documents).
8. See, e.g., ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 240(b)(1) ("A charity
other than a charitable trust may change its purpose to another charitable purpose by... [a]mending its
articles of incorporation.").
9. See. e.g., id. § 245(b) ("A charity other than a charitable trust may use its assets, other than
restricted gifts imposing contrary requirements, for any pre- or post-amendment purpose.").
10. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT vii (1964) (referring to the policy "of bringing the text [of
the MNCA] still more closely in accord with the Model Business Corporation Act"); MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT iv, vii (1957).
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law after the law of for-profit or business corporations, I I whose boards are
authorized to "set[] the course of the enterprise by determining the com-
pany's general objectives, goals, and philosophies."' 12 For this reason, mis-
sion accountability in nonmembership, nondonative charitable corporations
may seem vacuous: the board displays accountability by adhering to the
charitable objectives it has elected to pursue, not to alter, or both-unless
and until it elects to alter them.
In recent years, a growing number of commentators and state govern-
ments have expressed concern or displeasure over "the seeming unbounded
discretion in a corporate board to alter the charity's purpose. ' 13 In their
search for legal doctrines to limit this discretion, some of these critics have
looked to trust law principles for ideas and inspiration. 14 This move-
mentl 5-call it "trust law parallelism"-regards the charitable trust and
11. See, e.g., Stern v- Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training Sch., 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C.
1974) (mem.) ("[T]he modem trend is to apply corporate rather than trust principles in determining the
liability of the directors of charitable corporations, because their functions are virtually indistinguish-
able from those of their 'pure' corporate counterparts."); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§ 8.30 & cmt. 1 (1987) (commenting that the RMINCA's standards of conduct for nonprofit directors
track the language of the Model Business Corporation Act, thereby settling "the dispute as to whether
directors of nonprofit corporations should meet the general business standards or the trustee stan-
dards"); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW AND REGULATION 152 (2004) (recounting that the RMNCA rejected the trust law standards for
nonprofit corporation fiduciaries, which "had theretofore been the law in a number ofjurisdictions").
12. JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 154 (1997).
13. ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 240 rptr's note 12 (citing several
articles in which commentators proposed legislation for greater state input when a corporate board
seeks to make organic changes in a charity's mission).
14. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note I1, at 440 ("In terms of effective and efficient regula-
tion of the charitable sector, the English rule that the assets of charitable corporations are subject to the
doctrines of cy pres and deviation, regardless of their source, and regardless of whether they were
given subject to explicit restrictions, is clearly preferable," with the caveat that these doctrines "should
be applied liberally.") (emphasis added); Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 250 (S.D.
2003) (explaining there are legal theories that would permit the imposition of a charitable trust on the
general assets of a nonprofit health care corporation selling its assets).
15. An Arlo Guthrie song contains an enjoyable take on how many people it takes to constitute a
movement:
You know, if one person, just one person does it they may think he's really sick and
they won't take him.
And if two people, two people do it, in harmony, they may think they're both [homosexuals]
and they won't take either of them.
And three people do it, three, can you imagine, three people walking in singin a bar of Alice's
Restaurant and walking out.
They may think it's an organization.
And can you, can you imagine fifty people a day, I said fifty people a day walking in singin a
bar of Alice's Restaurant and walking out.
And friends they may thinks it's a movement.
And that's what it is, the Alice's Restaurant Anti-Massacre Movement.




trust law as exemplars of mission accountability in charitable organiza-
tions; it thus advocates the importation of more trust law principles into the
law of charitable corporations. More specifically, it proposes changing two
default rules in nonprofit corporate law to make it harder for boards to redi-
rect corporate missions and assets, unless a corporate founder or unre-
stricted donors provide otherwise. First, it would impose a "duty of
obedience" on corporate directors, obliging them to adhere to the corpora-
tion's original mission, absent extraordinary circumstances (e.g., the mis-
sion has become impossible, illegal, or impracticable to pursue). 16 This
duty, it is said, is modeled after the trustee's duty to "administer[] a trust in
a manner faithful to the expressed wishes of the creator."17 Second, trust
law parallelism would impress a trust on a charitable corporation's unre-
stricted gifts (and perhaps additional assets) for those charitable purposes
set forth in its articles of incorporation (and perhaps those manifested in its
operations) at thc time such gifts were received.
This Article examines and evaluates the policy of trust law parallelism
and its platform for changing the default rules for charitable corporations.
To advance this analysis, it draws on the tools of economic agency theory
and Professor Robert Sitkoff s use of agency theory to analyze and help
evaluate the private donative trust-a close cousin of the charitable trust.
Under Sitkoff's view, the private trust can be seen as dominated by the
principal-agent relationship between the settlor and trustee, respectively, in
which the settlor engages the trustee to advance the interests of the trust's
beneficiaries (cast as a second principal to the trustee) according to the
settlor's instructions. As a normative matter, he claims, trust law should
recognize the settlor as its primary principal. The Article then draws on this
approach and agency theory more broadly to analyze the charitable trust.
This Article argues that agency theory in general and an agency analy-
sis of trust law in particular potentially offer two lessons for the law of
charitable corporations. First, one might conclude that the way to promote
mission accountability in charitable corporations is to identify corporate
analogues to the settlor-trustee relationship and import trust law principals
into nonprofit corporate law to address the analogous agency problems
triggered by these relationships. This is the lesson that trust law parallelism
draws from the settlor-trustee relationship, which it applies to two alleged
16. Cf ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 240(c)(1) (providing a charitable
corporation may change its charitable purpose to another charitable purpose without a determination by
its governing board "that the current purpose of the charity has failed").
17. DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 85 (1988) (citations
omitted).
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principal-agent relationships in the corporate context: founder-board and
general donor-board. The Article argues that trust law parallelism does not
adequately justify why the founder and general donors should be deemed
the primary principals.
The second lesson one might draw from an agency analysis of trust
law is that maintaining a diversity of legal forms and default rules for chari-
table activities reduces the time and money (a.k.a. "transaction costs") that
philanthropists must incur in modifying such forms and rules to best suit
their needs and preferences, which in turn could increase the volume of
charitable activity. This Article argues that diversity of form and rules is
the correct lesson, and that the lesson argues in favor of corporate law par-
allelism and against trust law parallelism. Lastly, it argues that default rules
for charitable corporations that provide boards with extensive discretion-
i.e., corporate law parallelism-work best for informed philanthropists who
appreciate the differences between charitable corporations and charitable
trusts, but that those same default rules raise a number of problems when
applied to uninformed philanthropists.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the relevant law of
charitable trusts and charitable corporations, focusing on the default rules
for changing a charity's objectives and using previously acquired unre-
stricted gifts to advance the new objectives. Part II discusses "trust law
parallelism" and the two trust-inspired doctrines it advocates to promote
mission accountability in charitable corporations. Part III provides a quick
primer on economic agency theory, discusses Professor Robert Sitkoff's
use of agency theory to analyze and evaluate the law of private donative
trusts, and offers an agency perspective on the law of charitable trusts. Part
IV considers the implications of agency theory and an agency analysis of
trust law for the law of charitable corporations. It assesses and rejects trust
law parallelism, and it considers how corporate law parallelism affects
philanthropists who are aware of the differences between charitable corpo-
rations and charitable trusts, as opposed those who do not appreciate this
distinction.
I. CHARITY LAW AND MISSION ACCOUNTABILITY
This section presents the charitable trust, the charitable corporation,
and each form's default rules regarding the governing body's control over
the charity's purposes and assets. The rules give corporate boards far more
discretion over these matters than charitable trustees enjoy.
2005]
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A. Nonprofit and Charitable Organizations
Nonprofit organizations are formed for some purpose or objective
other than maximizing their net earnings. 18 A nonprofit is bound by the
"nondistribution constraint," which bars it from distributing money or as-
sets to organizational insiders (e.g., members of its governing body)19 ex-
cept as reasonable payment for goods or services rendered. 20 A nonprofit's
earnings, if any, must be used to advance the organization's mission, for
example, by increasing the output of the services and goods it was formed
to provide.
2'
A charitable organization is a nonprofit formed for one of the purposes
defined as "charitable"; these include the relief of poverty, the advance-
ment of education or religion, and "other purposes that are beneficial to the
community." 22 A charity typically is organized as either a charitable trust
or nonprofit corporation. The archetypal charitable trust is created when a
donor ("settlor") executes a written instrument 23 that obligates another
party (the "trustee") to use the donated property for a charitable purpose.
2 4
The trustee is subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty (i.e., to subordinate
his interests the trust)25 and care (i.e., to exercise reasonable care and skill
in administering the trust).26 A donor can also create a charitable trust 27 or
its equivalent28 within a charitable corporation by making a gift to the en-
18. This purpose need not be charitable, as in the case of mutual benefit organizations.
19. Professor Henry Hansmann calls this prohibition the "nondistribution constraint," which he
posits as the nonprofit organization's essential characteristic. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Non-
profit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
20. Id.; FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, at 248-49.
21. Hansmann, supra note 19, at 838.
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003). "The definition of charity set forth in the
Restatement of the Law of Trusts controls across the board, from inheritance disputes to federal tax
law." Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
641 (2005).
23. See PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 77 (2d ed. 1994)
(explaining that the vast majority of trusts are created by the execution ofa formal written instrument).
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1957); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, at 187
("The duty of a fiduciary is, in essence, a duty of loyalty.").
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1957).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt.f(1957):
Where property is given to a charitable corporation, particularly where restrictions are
imposed by the donor, it is sometimes said by the courts that a charitable trust is created and
that the corporation is a trustee. It is sometimes said, however, that a charitable trust is not
created. This is a mere matter of terminology. The important question is whether and to what
extent the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts are applicable to charitable cor-
porations.
Ordinarily the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts are applicable to chari-
table corporations....
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tity that is restricted "to a single purpose within the range of purposes au-
thorized by" the corporation's articles of incorporation.
29
Most U.S. charities are organized as nonprofit corporations, 30 and
most of these are governed by boards of directors that select their own suc-
cessors ("self-perpetuating" boards). 31 One creates a nonprofit corporation
by delivering articles of incorporation to the office of the secretary of
state,32 and a corporation's legal existence commences with that office's
filing of those articles.33 A charity's articles specify that it is a charitable or
"public benefit" corporation 34 and that on dissolution its assets will be dis-
tributed to another charitable undertaking. 35 These articles can also state
the specific charitable purpose for which the corporation is being formed,
36
but some jurisdictions do not even require this.
37
B. DetA ult Rules for Mission Change in Charitable Organizations
Unless a trust's terms expand the trustees' discretion, trust law re-
quires trustees to advance a settlor's specific charitable purposes for as long
as these can be advanced. 38 This duty applies unless settlor's purposes have
been fulfilled 39 or frustrated (i.e., have become unlawful, impossible, or
impracticable to carry out). 40 When that occurs, the default rule permits the
29. George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of
Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102,
1151 (2004). A donor creates a trust, for example, by donating money to a nonprofit hospital corpora-
tion to support research on a particular disease or to establish an alcoholism treatment center. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) (explaining that a donation to a charitable institu-
tion for a specific purpose "creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the trustee for purposes
of the terminology and rules of this Restatement"); cf. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§ 8.30(e) & cmt. 1 (1987) (providing that if a charitable corporation holds property in trust, its directors
are not deemed to be trustees with respect to such property).
30. JAMES J. FISImAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 63 (2d ed. 2000).
31. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, at 159.
32. See. e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.01 (1987).
33. Id. § 2.03(a).
34. See, e.g., id. § 2.02(a)(2)(i).
35. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-02(a)(6), 14.06(a)(6).
36. See, e.g., id. § 2_02(a)(2)(i), (b)(l).
37. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-17-3-3(1) (West 2005) (nonprofit's articles of incorporation
may state the purpose(s) for which the corporation is organized, but is not required); REVISED MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(1) (1987).
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 379 cmt. a (1990) (ex-
plaining the trustee is obliged "to administer [the trust] solely in the interest of effectuating the charita-
ble purposes").
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 400 (1957).
40. Id. § 399. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also would apply cy pres to that portion of the
trust's property that is "wasteful to apply ... to the [settlor's] designated purpose." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). However, this proposition is controversial. See Robert A. Katz, A Pig
2005)
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courts to apply the trust's unexpended property "to a charitable purpose
that reasonably approximates the [original] designated purpose,"
4 1 "unless
the terms of the trust ... express a contrary intention."42 This is known as
the doctrine of"cy pres," from the Anglo-French term for "as near."
43
As compared to charitable trustees, a charitable corporation's board of
directors has more discretion over its charity's mission and assets, except
for restricted gifts, which are held in trust.44 This is in keeping with the
modem trend to pattern nonprofit corporate law after the law of for-profit
or business corporations. 45 This policy---once referred to as corporate law
"parallelism"46-applies to both matters of form and of substance. For
example, most states that have addressed the issue subject directors of
charitable corporations ("charitable directors") to the fiduciary duties ap-
plicable to directors of business corporations under business corporation
law, which are more lenient than the fiduciary duties applicable to trustees
under trust law.
4 7
Business corporation statutes typically authorize the board of directors
to "set[] the course of the enterprise by determining the company's general
objectives, goals, and philosophies" 48 and also "to adopt, amend, and re-
peal bylaws."49 Under corporate law parallelism, charitable directors have
all this authority and more. The directors of a business corporation cannot
fundamentally change the corporation's charter or organization without
shareholder approval. 50 Yet a nonmembership charitable corporation lacks
in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief
36 IND. L. REV. 251, 272-81 (2003) (discussing how charity law deals with alleged surplus funds for
disaster relief); Comment, Cy Pres Inexpediency and the Buck Trust, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 577, 691 (1986)
(discussing litigation involving alleged surplus funds and petition for cy pres expansion of purpose).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). Traditionally, cy pres would not apply unless
"the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).
43. H-IASKELL, supra note 23, at 262 (citation omitted).
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT
CORP. ACT § 11.07 cmt. (1987) ("A provision in a will or other instrument requiring that a bequest or
gift be used for a specified purpose is not negated by a [donee nonprofit corporation's] merger [with
another corporation.], .. [The surviving corporation] can only use the property for the specified pur-
poses."). However, even if a nonprofit corporation is deemed to hold property in trust, the directors are
not deemed to be trustees with respect to such property. See, e.g., id. § 8.30(e) & cmt. 1.
45. See supra note 11.
46. Seesupra note 10.
47. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, at 200; see REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§ 8.30(a)(1), (3) (1987) (stating directors' duty of loyalty obliges them to act in good faith in a manner
they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation).
48. COXETAL.,supra note 12, at 154.
49. Id. at 155-56.
50. Id. at 155.
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either shareholders or an electorate entitled to vote for board members or
give them the boot. Rather, a majority of directors typically suffices to
change the articles of incorporation, 51 unless the articles or bylaws impose
additional requirements. 52 Such authority presumably extends to the arti-
cles' statement of purposes. 53 Indeed, where corporate law parallelism
prevails, there seems to be no intrinsic limit on the board's ability to alter
the corporation's charitable purposes, so long as the requisite procedures
are followed. 54 This approach also gives the board plenary authority to
redirect the corporation's general funds (i.e., all funds other than restricted
gifts) to the amended purposes.
55
This expansive view of the board's authority finds indirect support in
the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (the "Act"), a leading state-
ment of corporate law parallelism. The Act nowhere suggests an articles'
statement of purposes cannot be amended. 56 Although the Act recognizes
the trust-like nature of restricted gifts, 57 it nowhere requires the use of gen-
eral funds for pre-amendment purposes only. The Act's restrictions on self-
51. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.02(b) (1987).
52. See, e.g., id. § 10.30 ("The articles may require an amendment to the articles or by-laws to be
approved in writing by a specified person or persons other than the board.").
53. See, e.g., United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Bethany Med. Ctr., Inc., 969 P.2d 859, 863-65
(Kan. 1998) (holding that district court violated due process by permanently enjoining a charitable
corporation's board from amending its articles of incorporation to change the plan for distributing its
assets on dissolution); Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1020-21 (Mass. 1986)
(recognizing a nonprofit corporation's board's authority to amend its articles of incorporation to alter its
mission); see also REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 10.01 (1987) ("A corporation may amend
its articles of incorporation at any time to add or change a provision that is required or permitted in the
articles or to delete a provision not required in the articles."); id. § 10.02(b); Thomas L. Greaney &
Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit lealthcare Enterprise, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y & L. 1, 56 n.205 (2005) ("It has long been assumed that a board may alter its mission by
amending its articles of incorporation.").
54. See, e.g., Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d at 1020 (dictum) (explaining that a nonprofit corpo-
ration could change its purposes, even if such amendments do not further the corporation's "dominant
charitable purpose," where the state nonprofit corporation statute does not explicitly limit a nonprofit
corporation's powers of amendment).
55. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, at 440. Fremont-Smith discussed a case where:
the court applied general corporate law principles under which the directors are virtually un-
restricted in their ability to direct disposition of the general funds of the corporation [i.e., all
funds except restricted gifts], whether they are amending its charitable purposes or selling its
assets and directing disposition of the proceeds.
Id. (citing Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242 (S.D. 2003); Banner Health System v.
Stenehjem, No. A3-02-121, 2003 WL 501821 (D.N.D. 2003)); cf. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d at
1021 (dictum) (commenting that a charitable corporation that amends its articles lacks unfettered discre-
tion to devote pre-amendment funds to new charitable purposes that are not similar or are even contra-
dictory to its prior charitable purposes).
56. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 53, at 56 n.205.
57. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.07 cmt. (1987) ("A provision in a will or other
instrument requiring that a bequest or gift be used for a specified purpose is not negated by a [donee
nonprofit corporation's] merger [with another corporation.] ... [The surviving corporation] can only
use the property for the specified purposes.").
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dealing do not change matters, notwithstanding the Reporter's claim that
these "will help [assure] potential donors that their contributions [(1)] will
be dedicated to the corporation's public purposes and [(2)] will not be used
for private gain of the corporation's members or managers." 58 Yet the text
only bears out the second assertion: self-dealing restrictions may deter the
use of donations for noncharitable ends, but they do not compel directors to
use donations for any particular charitable purpose. 59
II. PROMOTING MISSION ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHARITABLE
CORPORATIONS THROUGH TRUST LAW PARALLELISM
Corporate law parallelism has its critics. The application of for-profit
corporate law to charitable corporations, assert Professors Greaney and
Boozang, "has never adequately addressed the accountability void that
results from charitable corporations' lack of shareholders and market for
corporate control." 60 In an attempt to fill this void, some commentators and
officials advocate using trust law principles to curb board discretion. This
project is complicated by the fact that the settlor of a charitable trust is
typically both its founder as well as its funder, whereas in charitable corpo-
rations different parties typically play these roles. Trust law parallelism's
doctrinal agenda is thus two-fold. The first component-the duty of obedi-
ence-would tether the board more tightly to the corporation's original
(i.e., the founder's chosen) charitable purposes. The second component-
the charitable trust doctrine-would curb a corporation's ability to apply
unrestricted donations to newly adopted purposes.
Although these two doctrines are distinguishable conceptually, they
often lead to the same result. On several occasions, these principles have
been employed (even simultaneously, but not always by name, and not
always successfully) to challenge a corporate board's efforts to redirect a
corporation's focus and assets. Most of these instances involved nonprofit
health care corporations, including hospitals wanting to lease or sell their
main facilities in order to run outpatient clinics; 61 a multistate healthcare
58. Id, at xxvi (emphasis added) (citing id. § 8.31(b)).
59. This is true of the nondistribution constraint more generally. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 235 (1996) ("The nonprofit form is a very crude consumer protection
device. It does not create strong positive incentives for [a nonprofit's fiduciaries to] serv[e] customers
well; it simply reduces the incentives to serve them poorly.").
60. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 53, at 2 (citations omitted).
61. See, e.g., In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1999) (holding "the purposes of the corporation will be promoted by the sale of... the hospital's
assets") (quotation omitted); Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (holding hospital "cannot, consistent with the trust imposed upon it, abandon the operation of the
hospital business in favor of clinics").
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system selling its facilities in some locations in order to consolidate its
operations elsewhere; 62 and non-Catholic hospitals seeking to merge with
Catholic hospitals, where doing so would curtail the provision of abortions
and other reproductive services.
6 3
A. Duty of Obedience
Several commentators have asserted that directors of charitable corpo-
rations have a unique fiduciary duty64 to be faithful to their organization's
mission.65 In its mildest formulation, the duty of obedience puts a nonprofit
spin on the principle that a corporation should not engage in ultra vires acts
(i.e., acts "beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate
charter"). 66 In the nonprofit context, ultra vires prohibits a charitable cor-
poration from advancing charitable purposes other than those set forth in its
articles of incorporation. 67 Courts can enjoin a charitable corporation from
engaging in ultra vires transactions and can hold directors liable for engag-
ing in them.6
8
In addition to this negative command--do not advance purposes the
charity is not authorized to advance-the duty of obedience has a positive
component: directors should actively "carry out the mandates of the inden-
ture under which they operate."'69 Just as a for-profit board should aim to
maximize shareholder value, so too should a charitable board aim to maxi-
mize the fulfillment of the organization's mission70 and perhaps also aim to
62. See Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 248-49 (S.D. 2003) (holding that there are
legal theories that would permit the imposition of a charitable trust on the general assets of a nonprofit
health care corporation selling its assets within South Dakota).
63. See, e.g., Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey: Using the Charitable Trust Doc-
trine to Preserve Women 's Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 323, 323-27 (2000); N.H. ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT ON OPTIMA HEALTH § III (Mar. 10,
1998), available at http://doj.nh.gov/publications/optimal.html.
64. That is, in addition to the standard corporate law duties of loyalty and care.
65. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 227-29; KURTZ, supra note 17, at 21; Peggy Sasso,
Searching for Trust in the Not-For-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the Duty of Obedience to En-
sure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1485, 1530 (2003) (arguing that higher duty standard should be
applicable to not-for-profit directors).
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1559 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "'ultra vires").
67. Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 661 (1998) ("[T]he uses to which charitable fiduciaries may properly
put assets entrusted to them are said to be constrained, not only by the outer limits of charitability, but
also by specific purpose provisions in the charity's organizational documents ....
68. Id.
69. KURTZ, supra note 17, at 84 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505 (Pa.
1960)).
70. Sasso, supra note 65, at 1528 (analogizing that the nonprofit director's duty to advance the
charitable mission is "roughly equivalent" to the for-profit director's duty to increase shareholder
value).
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maximize the satisfaction (or "philanthropic returns") of those who have
invested their time, money, and energy into the enterprise. 7'
As presented above, the milder version of the duty of obedience
speaks only to the charitable purposes for which the corporation is cur-
rently organized to advance-i.e., those set forth in a corporation's articles
of incorporation. It does not bar the board from altering these purposes, so
long as (at a minimum) the requisite procedures are followed. 72 The most
robust version of the duty, by contrast, expects boards to adhere to the cor-
poration's original purposes absent a determination that these purposes
have failed (e.g., they have become impossible, illegal, or impracticable to
pursue). 73 This accords with Kurtz's description of the duty as akin to a
trustee's duty to "administer[] a trust in a manner faithful to the expressed
wishes of the creator." 74 Fidelity to a charity's original purposes, states
Professor David H. Smith, can be "personalized as identification with the
particular objectives of the [corporation's] donor or founders."75 In this
vein, Professor Atkinson describes fidelity to the original mission as "the
charitable equivalent of 'Honor thy father and thy mother,' with the organi-
zation's founders and donors standing in locoparentis."76
In 1999, a New York trial court accepted the most robust version of
the duty of obedience in Matter of Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital
v. Spitzer.7 7 After losing patients and revenues for many years, the Manhat-
tan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital ("MEETH") planned to sell its main facility
and use the proceeds, most notably, to operate freestanding clinics in un-
derserved neighborhoods. 78 A state trial court refused to approve this plan,
71. Triantis, supra note 29, at 1145 ("Whereas an investor in the commercial sector seeks a finan-
cial return, the charitable donor often pursues a philanthropic return in the improved welfare of others.")
(citation omitted).
72. See, e.g., Reiser, supra note 7, at 215 ("Nonprofit organizations ... must abide by their origi-
nal missions or use legitimate means to transform those missions over time.").
73. See, e.g., KURTZ, supra note 17, at 85 ("Unless allowed by law, nonprofit directors may not
deviate in any substantial way from the duty to fulfill the particular purposes for which the organization
was created."); In re Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(requiring "reasoned determination" that nonprofit cannot continue to operate toward fulfilling its
mission before approving sale of assets); cf ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2,
§ 240(c)(1) (providing that a charitable corporation may change its charitable purpose to another chari-
table purpose without a determination by its governing board "that the current purpose of the charity
has failed").
74. KURTZ, supra note 17, at 85 (citations omitted).
75. DAVID H. SMITH, ENTRUSTED: THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRUSTEESHIP 5 (1995).
76. Atkinson, supra note 67, at 661.
77. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d at 592-95; see ALl, Nonprofit Law,
Council Draft No. I, supra note 2, § 240 rptr's note 10 ("This duty [of obedience] was accepted in
Matter of Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital v. Spitzer .... ).
78. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d at 576. MEETH submitted its petition
pursuant to New York's not-for-profit corporation law § 511. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
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and this decision turned on its understanding and application of the duty of
obedience. The court declared:
[T]he duty of obedience ... mandates that a [charitable corporation's]
Board, in the first instance, seek to preserve its original mission. Embar-
kation upon a course of conduct which turns it away from the charity's
central and well-understood mission should be a carefully chosen option
of last resort. Otherwise, a Board facing difficult financial straits might
find sale of its assets, and "reprioritization" of its mission, to be an at-
tractive option, rather than taking all reasonable efforts to preserve the
mission which had been the object of its stewardship.
79
MEETH's board breached its duty of obedience, the court found, be-
cause it failed to make "a reasoned and studied determination... that the
financial difficulties [it faced] made it impossible to ensure the survival of
MEETH."
80
As the MEETH decision demonstrates, the most robust version of the
duty of obedience effectively requires a board to advance the corporate
mission for as long as that is possible (within reason). Directors cannot
fundamentally alter a corporation's charitable purpose simply because they
believe that their efforts and the entity's resources could serve more so-
cially valuable ends.
B. The Charitable Trust Doctrine
Naturally enough, the law imposes more restrictions on a charitable
corporation's use of restricted gifts (i.e., gifts that expressly limit their use
to specific purposes) than unrestricted gifts (i.e., outright gifts with no ex-
press restrictions on their use). A restricted gift creates a charitable trust or
its functional equivalent, 81 and the donee is obliged to honor these restric-
tions even if it later changes its charitable purposes. 82 By contrast, an unre-
stricted gift does not create a formal "trust" within the meaning of trust
law, 83 and the donee can use it for any charitable purpose set forth in its
§ 51 l(d) (McKinney 2005) (a court may authorize the sale of all or substantially all the assets of a
nonmembership charitable corporation "[i]f it shall appear, to the satisfaction of the court... that the
purposes of the corporation ... will be promoted" by the transaction).
79. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 715 N.Y.S.2d at 595 (emphases added).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Supra note 44.
82. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 11.07 cmt. (1987) ("A provision in a will
or other instrument requiring that a bequest or gift be used for a specified purpose is not negated by a
[donee nonprofit corporation's] merger [with another corporation.] ... [The surviving corporation] can
only use the property for the specified purposes.").
83. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THPIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003) ("An outright devisee or
donation to a nonproprietary hospital or university or other charitable institution, expressly or impliedly
to be used for its general purposes, is charitable but does not create a trust as that term is used in this
Restatement.").
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articles of incorporation. Critically, a charitable corporation can use unre-
stricted gifts (as well as nondonated assets) for any charitable purpose it
subsequently adopts by amending its articles. 84
The "charitable trust doctrine"-another instance of trust law parallel-
ism in action-seeks to erase the legal distinction between restricted and
unrestricted gifts and also seeks to extend the realm of trust law to reach a
charitable corporation's unrestricted gifts. More specifically, the doctrine
requires that, when a charitable corporation changes its charitable purposes
by amending its articles of incorporation, the unrestricted gifts the donee
received prior to the amendment can be used only for its pre-amendment
charitable purposes. Presumably, these assets could be redeployed if the
pre-amendment purposes had failed (i.e., had become illegal, impossible, or
impracticable to advance). 85 The pre-amendment charitable purposes are
determined in the first instance by the donee's articles of incorporation.
86
These purposes also can be deduced from the way the donee actually has
operated 87 (i.e., what have been its dominant activities 88), representations
made to tax authorities, and representations made to the public when solic-
iting donations. 89
The most expansive version of the charitable trust doctrine would re-
strict a charitable corporation's use of pre-amendment, nondonated assets
(e.g., user fees) to pre-amendment purposes only. This is justified on
grounds that the corporation's nondonated assets are inextricably connected
to the donated assets in two ways: first, "because it is [allegedly] impossi-
ble to separate out [unrestricted gifts] from non-donated assets, all assets
must be treated as subject to a trust;" 90 and second, the donated assets were
84. This is the position taken by the first council draft of the ALI's Principles of the Law of
Nonprofit Organizations. ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 245(b).
85. Michael W. Peregrine, Charitable Trust Laws and the Evolving Nature of the Nonprofit
Hospital Corporation, 30 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 11, 12 (1997).
86. See, e.g., Pacific Home v. Los Angeles County, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. 1953) (providing that,
where a charitable corporation organized for a specific charitable purpose accepts assets, this "estab-
lishes a charitable trust for the declared corporate purposes as effectively as though the assets had been
accepted from a donor who had expressly provided in the instrument evidencing the gift that it was to
be held in trust solely for such charitable purposes"). Cf Greaney & Boozang, supra note 53, at 66
(questioning whether pre-Revised Model Nonprofit Corporations Act cases that impose a trust on
unrestricted gifts to charitable corporations remain good law in California).
87. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
88. Peregrine, supra note 85, at 13.
89. Queen ofAngels Hosp., 138 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
90. Greaney & Boozang, supra note 53, at 69 (citations omitted). See generally id. at 66-72
(surveying and critiquing arguments in favor of imposing a charitable trust on the entire assets of a
charitable corporation).
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the "base capital" that enabled the corporation to acquire its nondonated
assets.91
1ll. MISSION ACCOUNTABILITY IN TRUSTS: AN AGENCY THEORY
ANALYSIS
To address the perceived deficit of nonprofit mission accountability,
some nonprofit commentators and regulators propose applying charitable
trust law principles to charitable corporations. In many organizational con-
texts, agency theory provides a useful tool for framing and exploring ac-
countability issues. This section lays the groundwork for assessing "trust
law parallelism" from an agency perspective. It does so by providing a
primer on agency theory, discussing Professor Robert Sitkoff's illuminating
use of agency theory to analyze the law of private donative trusts, 92 and
considering its implications for the law of charitable trusts.
A. An Agency Theory Primer
Economic agency theory (as distinguished from agency law93) studies
relationships in which one party, a "principal," benefits when another party,
an "agent," performs a certain task with care or effort. 94 Agency relation-
ships are problematic insofar as the interests of the parties diverge and
there is an information asymmetry between them, which prevents the prin-
cipal from verifying whether the agent pursues the principal's interests
rather than his own.95 The arrangement gives rise to at least two types of
costs (a.k.a. "agency costs"): monitoring costs and residual loss of wel-
fare. 96 The "monitoring costs" are the expenditures on devices to ensure
91. Patrick Coffey et al., The "Charitable Trust" Controversy Confronting Banner Health and
Other Nonprofit Healthcare Systems, 16 HEALTH LAW. 1, 4 (2003).
92. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621 (2004).
93. Under agency law, a legal agency relationship requires the ongoing existence of a principal
under whose control the agent acts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957); Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 1.01 & cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001). In contrast, economic agency relation-
ships require neither a principal nor an agent, although the agency costs that accompany such relation-
ships are undoubtedly lower when these requirements are met.
94. Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 225, 225 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). Such relationships typically are described using the
metaphor of a contract between the principal and agent. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An
Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989).
95. Id.
96. HANSMANN, supra note 59, at 304 n.2 (noting that some scholars posit a third element of
agency costs known as "bonding" costs, which refers to the costly measures the agent incurs to assure
the principal of his good behavior and fidelity to her interest, as well as to compensate the principal for
his misbehavior); see, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 1he Firm: Managerial
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that the agent does the principal's bidding. These include monitoring the
agent's activities more closely, measuring his output, and providing him
with special incentives to align his interests more closely to hers. The "re-
sidual loss" consists of the principal's loss of utility or welfare due to the
agent's opportunistic pursuit of his own interests at her expense, notwith-
standing the effect monitoring expenditures have. Whatever the principal
does (or does not do), she will experience some residual loss, incur moni-
toring costs, or both: her agency costs thus always will be greater than zero.
This dilemma is known as an "agency problem." The agency perspective
invites us to consider measures to limit the agent's self-serving behavior in
a cost-effective manner, and thereby minimize the agency costs inherent in
this relationship.
97
The agency model often is applied to the relationship between the
shareholders (principals) of a publicly traded, for-profit corporation and its
salaried corporate executives (agents), whom the shareholders hire to run
the firm in the shareholders' best interests. 98 This application can be quite
fruitful because we can state with relative certainty that what the typical
shareholder wants is to realize profit (capital gains) by selling the stock for
more than what she paid for it. Likewise, it is relatively clear what the
shareholder wants the corporate executives to do for her: to act in a manner
that increases the stock's price. An agency problem arises because salaried
corporate executives, whose activities cause the price of stock to rise, re-
ceive only a fraction of the wealth (capital gains) they generate for share-
holders. Such executives thus have less incentive than shareholders to
cause the stock price to rise. The measurable nature of a shareholder's in-
terest, however, makes it easier to monitor the executives' performance,
most notably, by ascertaining the firm's stock price. As a result, the share-
holders' agency problem and attendant costs vis-Ai-vis corporate executives
tend to be tractable.
In this context, the concept of "accountability" can be usefully framed
and analyzed using the tools of economic agency theory. Many corporate
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON, 305, 308 (1976) (summarizing
unavoidable transaction costs of agency relationship); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW
AND ECONOMICS 35-36 (2002) (defining agency costs as including monitoring and bonding costs)
(citation omitted). Professor Hansmann sees bonding expenditures as a social cost of monitoring the
agents. HANSMANN, supra note 59, at 304 n.2. For convenience, I will not discuss these.
97. Eisenhardt, supra note 94, at 59.
98. Chris Comforth, Introduction: The Changing Context of Governance Emerging Issues and
Paradoxes, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: WHAT DO BOARDS
Do? 1, 7 (Chris Comforth ed., 2003) (explaining agency theory "has been the dominant theory of the
[business] corporation and corporate governance arrangements") (citation omitted); Eisenhardt, supra
note 94, at 59 (referring to several articles on minimizing agency costs via different mechanisms).
[Vol 80:689
MISSION ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHARITABLE CORPORA TIONS
law scholars argue that as a normative matter, corporate law should aim to
reduce the agency costs inherent in the shareholder-director relationship 99
and in this way make directors more accountable to shareholders.100 The
standard duties of loyalty and care help advance this goal,101 as do the
shareholders' right to elect the directors and bring derivative suits. 102 Even
in the absence of shareholder action, the markets for capital and corporate
control induce directors to act in ways that benefit shareholders and punish
those who do not. 1
03
B. An Agency Costs Theory of Private Donative Trusts
In Sitkoff s view, the private trust can be seen as the site of two key
principal-agent relationships: settlor-trustee and beneficiary-trustee. In the
archetypical donative trust, a settlor (principal #1) engages a trustee (qua
settlor's agent) to manage a portfolio of assets in the best interests of the
beneficiaries, subject to the settlor's instructions as set forth in the trust
instrument. 104 This arrangement triggers an agency problem: will the trus-
tee "remain loyal to the settlor's original wishes," or will he "slight or ig-
nore what [the settlor] would have wanted[?]" 105 Sitkoff describes this
relationship as "temporal," 106 although a more precise characterization
might be "noncontemporaneous" in that the settlor may be deceased or
otherwise absent for at least some time period covered by their relation-
ship.107 For example, if a settlor creates a testamentary trust, the agency
relationship does not commence until after the settlor's death.
Insofar as the beneficiaries gain as a result of the trustee's activities,
they function as a second principal (principal #2)-albeit a derivative
one-to the trustee (qua beneficiaries' agent). This arrangement triggers
99. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 96, at 207 ("[Miuch of corporate law is best understood as
a mechanism for constraining these agency costs [in the shareholder-manager relationship].").
100. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and
For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 457, 465 (1996) ("In a business firm, 'ac-
countability' is the mechanism by which the corporate board and management (the 'agents') answer to
the shareholders (the 'principal').").
101. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 261-83, 290-
91(1986).
102. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 96, at 37.
103. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112-14 (1965); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 96, at 37, 207.
104. See Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 624,
105. Id. at621,624.
106. Id- at 621.
107. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 314 (4th ed. 1999) (defining "contempora-
neous" as "existing or happening in the same period of time").
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the "usual" agency problem that arises when one party (here the trustee)
manages assets while another party (here the beneficiaries) bears the risks
and marginal costs (as well as the benefits) of the first party's managerial
decisions. 108 In this case, the issue is "whether the trustee-manager will act
in the best interests of the beneficiaries," 09 This dual set of agency prob-
lems makes the trust distinctive. "[T]he core insight that animates the
agency costs analysis" of the private trust, claims Sitkoff, is "[t]hat [the
settlor] saddled her transfer [of property] to [the beneficiaries] with the
friction of competing principal-agent relationships."' 10 The for-profit cor-
porate form, by contrast, "presents one dominant source of agency costs,"
namely, "the shareholder/manager relationship.")"
The trustee's task may be uncomfortable because settlor and benefici-
aries may have divergent interests and preferences. 112 The settlor could
have made an outright gift to the beneficiaries for them to use as they
please, but she chose not to do so. Her decision can be explained in a num-
ber of ways. One can describe the settlor as altruistic but paternalistic. She
is altruistic because she derives satisfaction from increases to the benefici-
aries' well-being, i.e., her utility function includes the beneficiaries' utility
as one of its components. Yet she also has a "(paternalistic) view of the
beneficiaries' expected utility" and so does not (wholly) defer to the bene-
ficiaries' view of their own utility.113 Alternatively, one can describe the
settlor as an "impure" altruist. The purely altruistic donor, according to
Professor Eric Posner, cares about the donee's welfare or utility, whereas
the impure altruist cares about the donee's consumption. 114 The pure altru-
ist is more inclined to make an outright gift: by maximizing the donee's
subjective utility, she thereby maximizes her own. The parties' interests are
thus perfectly aligned. The impure altruist, by contrast, gains utility by
altering the donee's consumption of goods or services in ways that likely
increase but do not maximize the donee's utility. 1 5 Either account of the
settlor's utility function explains why "parents often pay a child's tuition
108. Sitkoffsupra note 92, at 658.
109. Id. at 683. Sitkoff describes the beneficiaries as the trust's residual claimants" insofar as they
"are limited to taking so much as the trust instrument allows out of whatever is lefi of the trust's assets
when all other claims are settled." Id. at 646-47.
110. Id. at 624.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 649 n.136.
114. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997
Wis. L, REV. 567, 573.
115. Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and Organiza-
tions?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 1, 10, 15.
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rather than giving him cash which the child may squander," or why "[a]
Good Samaritan may offer food or clothing to a poor person, rather than
money, for fear the recipient would use the money to purchase drugs."' 16
The settlor's and beneficiaries' divergent interests may force the trus-
tee to choose between: (a) altering the beneficiaries' consumption-and
presumably increasing their utility-according to the settlor's design; or (b)
maximizing the beneficiaries' utility according to their own likings. Sit-
koff's normative claim is that trust law should favor the former. More pre-
cisely, trust law should aim to maximize the beneficiaries' welfare,' 17 "but
only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of
the settlor."'118 In other words, trust law should recognize the settlor as the
trust's (and trustee's) "primary" or "dominant" principal. 119
Sitkoff points to trust law's Claflin doctrine as an example of settlor
primacy in action. This doctrine holds that absent the settlor's consent (in-
cluding trust terms to that effect) 120 a trust may not be terminated or modi-
fied if doing so "would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the
trust," even if all of the beneficiaries consent to the proposed termination or
modification. 12 1 The Claflin doctrine's "dominant idea," states one horn-
book, "is the fulfillment of the settlor's wishes."' 122 Its practical effect, ac-
cording to Sitkoff, is that "unless the trustee consents, American trusts are
difficult to amend or terminate once established."' 123 As a result, the trustee
has more leeway "to preserve the settlor's original design, regardless of the
beneficiaries' wishes, which is what the settlor likely would have
wanted." 124 In this way, he concludes, the doctrine "helps align the inter-
ests of the settlor and the trustee," 12 5 thereby mitigating the settlor's agency
problem vis-a-vis the trustee.
Sitkoff claims that settlor primacy in private trust law will make both
settlors and beneficiaries better off and in this way increase social
116. Posner, supra note 114, at 573.
117. Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 669.
118. Id. at621.
119. id. at 683 84; see id. at 644, 669 (discussion of settlor as the trust's "dominant principal").
120. The Claflin doctrine is a nonmandatory default rule so that the trust instrument can authorize
beneficiaries to terminate the trust prematurely. Id at 663.
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003) (citing Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 455
(Mass. 1889)).
122. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES: IN-
CLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 9.6 (2d ed. 2001).




wealth. 126 This claim reasonably assumes: (a) by increasing the confidence
of grantors that their trust instructions will be followed, we "increase[] the
willingness of grantors to create a trust in the first place"; 127 and (b) at the
macro level, more trusts will be "advantageous to potential beneficiaries as
a class,"'128 even if each trust benefits its particular beneficiaries less than it
could, i.e., if its assets were used for what they really want (e.g., fancy
sports cars or drugs), rather than what the settlor wants them to consume
(e.g., education, food, and clothing).
At its core, the case for settlor primacy in trust law rests on its ability
to reduce the transaction costs that grantors (gift givers) incur in making
gifts. Transaction costs are defined as "[tihose costs other than price which
are incurred in trading goods and services." 129 In the context of contract
formation, for example, these include the costs of "bargain[ing] with poten-
tial sellers (or buyers) to some agreement about exchanging some goods
and services for others," anticipating and "cover[ing] various future contin-
gencies that might affect the agreement," and "formaliz[ing] the agreement,
putting it into the form of an enforceable contract." 130 Such costs also arise
in the context of trusts, which can be conceived as a contract between the
settlor and trustee for the benefit of a third party. 13 1 As Sitkoff explains,
trust law, like contract law, offers a set of standardized terms that can re-
duce the transaction costs for the settlor-trustee contract: "[b]y invoking the
law of trusts, the settlor and the trustee need only record the extent to which
their deal deviates from the default governance regime."
132
Critically, Sitkoff assumes that if trust law's default rules were
changed so as to weaken the settlor's control over the use of her gift, the
overall volume of gifting would fall, 133 thereby reducing aggregate social
wealth. This is reasonable if (a) there is no change in the demand among
potential grantors for control over the use of their gifts, 134 and (b) the de-
fault rules for alternative modes of making gifts (e.g., outright transfers)
provide grantors with even less control than trust law's post-change default
126. Id. This claim requires assuming that a legal regime defending settlor primacy in private trusts
does not create significant negative externalities.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 432 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992).
130. DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 16 (2004)
131. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627
(1995).
132. Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 630 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 659 n.197.
134. For convenience, I assume that the demand of potential settlors for control over their gifts is
exogenously defined and thus unaffected by modifying trust law's default rules to reduce settlor control-
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rules. In the post-change world, settlors would have to spend more time and
money (i.e., incur additional transaction costs) modifying trust law's de-
fault rules to obtain the same level of control afforded by trust law's pre-
change default rules. Yet this change would not significantly reduce the
transaction costs of grantors who want less control over their gift giving
(and more donee autonomy) than provided by trust law's post-change de-
fault rules. That option was and would still be available under the default
rules for other modes of gift giving (e.g., outright transfers).
The broader point is that society is better off offering grantors more
rather than fewer modes (i.e., legal vehicles) for gift giving, whose default
rules provide grantors with varying degrees of control over a donee's use of
a gift. More variety means that each grantor will find a mode whose default
rules more closely resemble the degree of control she desires. This in turn
reduces the total amount of transactions costs that grantors as a class incur
when customizing the various modes' default rules to fit their preferences.
C. Charitable Organizations That Receive Restricted Gifts
In extending an agency analysis of private trusts to charitable trusts,
we must take into account, inter alia, the special nature of the charitable
trust's beneficiaries. 135 Whereas a private trust must benefit identified or
identifiable individuals (e.g., the settlor's children, including those yet un-
born' 36), a charitable trust can confer benefits directly upon members of an
indefinite class of persons, such as "the poor of the city of Yorkville. ''137
The charitable trust's ultimate beneficiaries, however, are an indefinite
class-indeed, the definitive indefinite class: the public or the community
at large. 138 In this sense, the immediate recipients of a charitable trust's
135. Among other differences, a private trust can be formed for any legal purpose, and its duration
is (or historically has been) limited by the Rule Against Perpetuities, whereas a charitable trust must be
formed for a legally charitable purpose and can have infinite duration. See HASKELL, supra note 23, at
255-56; Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 658 (discussing "the ongoing erosion of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties" in the private trust context) (citations omitted).
136. If the private trust's instrument does not name all the beneficiaries at the outset, then it must
"fumish[] the court and trustee with the requisite means for identifying these beneficiaries during the
course of the trust administration." GEORGE GLEASON 1OGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 363 (2d ed. rev. 1991).
137. Id. Although charitable trusts typically benefit an indefinite, open-ended class of persons (e.g.,
the victims of boating disasters), this is not required. They sometimes can benefit a definite or closed
group of persons. The charitableness of such a trust turns on whether the members of this group are
sufficiently numerous "so that the community is interested in the enforcement of the trust."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 375 (1957); see Katz, supra note 40, at 262-63.
138. Bogert & Bogert, supra note 136, § 363; see James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Ac-
countability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218, 224 (2003) ("Charitable trusts are distinct from private trusts" in that,
inter alia, "[t]he object of charitable trusts is to benefit the community rather than private individuals.").
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
largesse (e.g., Yorkville's poor) are the conduits through which the benefits
flow to the public. 1
39
An agency analysis of the charitable trust draws attention to how trust
law addresses the distinct agency problems that arise in this context.
1 40
Here too, the trustees of a charitable trust can be seen as the agents of two
principals-the trust's settlor and its beneficiaries (i.e., the public)-with
divergent interests. 14 1 The public may benefit from any number of charita-
ble purposes (e.g., relieving tsunami victims, studying the possibility of life
on Pluto), but it benefits from some purposes more than others. All things
being equal, the public's interests in any particular trust are best served by
putting its assets to their most socially productive use. Any single trust's
assets, moreover, almost always can be put to more socially valuable uses
than those selected by the settlor. The settlor, by contrast, wants the trust's
assets to be used for her specified purposes, even if other purposes could
benefit the public more. 142 The settlor's agency problem vis-A-vis the trus-
tees is aggravated by the fact that a charitable trust can last as long as our
legal system. Given this time horizon, the trustees will inevitably develop
idiosyncratic charitable objectives that differ from the settlor' s.
As this analysis shows, a charitable trust's trustees may be tempted to
diverge from the settlor's instructions in order to generate what they be-
lieve is a greater benefit for the beneficiaries (i.e., the public) or to advance
their own idiosyncratic charitable objectives. Trust law forbids this. In any
particular trust, trust law favors the settlor's charitable objectives-even if
motivated by paternalistic or impure altruism--over the public's interests
or the trustees' charitable objectives. It does so by requiring the trustees to
advance the settlor's specific charitable purpose insofar as it can be ad-
vanced (within reason). Here, as in the private trust context, settlor primacy
assumes that: (a) the number of charitable trusts created reflects the would-
be settlor's level of confidence that her instructions will be followed; and
139. BOGERT & BOG3ERT, supra note 136, § 363.
140. The following analysis also applies to restricted gifts received and held in trust by charitable
corporations. See supra notes 34-39.
141. See, e.g., Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 435 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (the attorney general and donor have related but distinct and sometimes incongruent interests in a
charitable gift; the donor seeks to have his or her intent faithfully executed, whereas the Attorney
General promotes the interests of the gift's beneficiaries); Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians &
Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 936 (Cal. 1964) ("[Gifts made to a] charitable institution can be used only for
the purposes for which they were received in trust. The trust is not fulfilled merely by applying the
assets in the public interest.").
142. Stated differently, the settlor is likely to be an impure altruist who seeks to alter the public's
consumption of goods and services, rather than increase social welfare as broadly understood or objec-
tively defined. A purely altruistic setlor, by contrast, is more inclined to create a trust simply "For
charitable purposes."
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(b) at the macro level, more charitable trusts will produce more social bene-
fit overall, even if each trust benefits society less than it could. As Profes-
sor Brody explains:
In general, the law honors donors' restrictions on charitable gifts, often
into perpetuity, in order to encourage charitable giving. In deciding be-
tween devoting their property to charitable use and keeping it in the fam-
ily, donors take into account the likelihood that their donated property
will remain governed by their wishes. Implicitly the state has determined
that net social welfare increases by permitting the dead hand of the testa-
tor to dictate the enjoyment of donated wealth forever.
143
Yet this is not the whole story. At the micro level, trust law does not
completely subordinate the public's interests to the settlor's. If the trust's
specific purpose is thwarted, the doctrine of cy pres sets a rebuttable default
rule that keeps the trust's assets flowing in charitable channels, 144 where
they presumably will benefit the public more than if returned to the settlor
or her residuary legatees.14 5 Courts can exercise this power, moreover,
even if the settlor would have wanted the assets to return to her or her re-
siduary legatees, unless the trust instrument expressly states this prefer-
ence. 146 Additionally, some authorities hold that in selecting a substitute
purpose "among purposes reasonably close to the [settlor's] original [pur-
pose]," a court may pick the one that "has a distinctly greater usefulness
143. Evelyn Brody, The Legal Framework for Restricted Gifts: The Cy Pres Doctrine and Corpo-
rate Charities I (draft Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
144. Supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. This defect could cause a private trust to fail. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003). Comment b provides:
The cy pres doctrine is not applicable to private trusts. There are, however, narrower but
analogous principles that apply to both private and charitable trusts, as particularly illustrated
by the rule of equitable deviation in § 66 allowing courts, in certain circumstances, to modify
the means of accomplishing a trust purpose.
Id.
145. See Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J.
295, 306 (1988). Macey noted:
An alternative rule which stipulates that the settlor's assets always revert back to his heirs
whenever any significant aspect of the settlor's intentions are thwarted, unless the settlor pro-
vides for a contrary result,... would provide a better guide to courts on the value to the
settlor of his second choice asset allocation.
Id.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003) (providing that cy pres applies "unless the
terms of the trust provide otherwise"). "In theory," however, "the doctrine of cy pres exists to effect the
unstated intent of the settlor" or, rather, what the settlor would have wanted "had he thought about the
matter." HASKELL, supra note 23, at 262. One can thus argue, as does Judge Richard Posner, that the cy
pres doctrine facilitates both social efficiency and donor intent:
[S]ince no one can foresee the future, a rational donor knows that his intentions might eventu-
ally be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances and may therefore be presumed to accept
implicitly a rule permitting modification of the terms of the bequest in the event that an un-
foreseen change frustrates his original intention,
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 556 (5th ed. 1998), see id. at 557.
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than the others."' 147 This approach serves the public's micro interests more
than the traditional rule, which required the substituted purpose to be "as
near as possible" (from the Norman French term "cy pres comme possi-
ble") to the original one, without regard to its social value. 148 Trust law
also vests the cy pres power in the court and not the trustees. 149 As a result,
the substitute purpose is more likely to maximize the public welfare rather
than conform to the trustees' idiosyncratic charitable objectives.
IV. MISSION ACCOUNTABILITY IN CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS: AN
AGENCY THEORY ANALYSIS
An agency theory analysis of trust law, and agency theory in general,
can sharpen our thinking about mission accountability in the charitable
corporation as such. First, it provides a useful way to describe and analyze
the tensions within and among a charitable corporation's constituent rela-
tionships. Second, it clues us in to a normative argument for maintaining a
diversity of legal forms and default regimes for charitable activities: such
diversity reduces the transaction costs that informed philanthropists incur in
tailoring off-the-rack legal forms to match their preferences as to how
much discretion to delegate to a charity's governing body. When it comes
to setting default rules for uninformed philanthropists, however, the policy
of reducing transaction costs may give way to broader social concerns.
A. Agency Theory Offers Users Descriptive and Analytical Tools
What can an agency theory analysis of trust law teach us about mis-
sion accountability in the charitable corporation as such (i.e., unrelated to
its status as the trustee of restricted gifts)? As a first cut, agency theory
offers a potentially useful set of descriptive and analytical tools. The typi-
cal charitable corporation has numerous parties ("stakeholders") interested
in its operations and who make demands on it. In a nonmembership charity,
these include: the person(s) who create the corporation; those who purchase
its services and goods for their personal consumption ("clients"); employ-
ees; volunteers; the specific community in which it operates; the public in
general (i.e., the ultimate beneficiary); and members of the board of direc-
tors. If we posit the board as an agent, we can identify its prospective prin-
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (2003).
148. See Triantis, supra note 29, at 1158 (noting that under traditional cy pres doctrine, "courts are
confined to authorizing a substitute purpose based on similarity to the original purpose rather than on
social value").
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (2003).
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cipals by asking which stakeholders stand to benefit from the directors'
activities, and whose relationship with the directors can be meaningfully
described using a contract metaphor. For each prospective principal, we
can analyze their agency problem vis-A-vis the directors and consider ways
to mitigate that problem.
This can be a useful exercise. At the very least, it provides a formal
explanation for why a board of directors-even with full information and
the best of intentions--cannot define the corporation's mission in a way
that pleases everybody: the board (to paraphrase Professor Sitkoff) is sad-
dled with the friction of numerous and potentially competing principal-
agent relationships.150 To gain more leverage from agency theory, how-
ever, we must answer the normative question (as posed by Professor
Brody): "Who are the 'principals' to whom society wants the [charitable
corporation's directors] to answer[?]"'' Once we identify the privileged
principal, "we can then ask the subsequent question of how to align the
interests of the charity with the interests of the principals."' 152 Otherwise,
the pursuit of mission accountability is a Rash6mon-like exercise in which
"[o]ne stakeholder's mission drift might be another's appropriate respon-
siveness, and each of these conflicting characterizations is correct from that
[party's] perspective."'
' 53
In a charitable trust, the settlor's claim to the status of (primary) prin-
cipal may seem self-evident. 154 This is less true of (or flat wrong for) the
nonmembership charitable corporation that holds no restricted gifts. Trust
law parallelism seeks to export trust law's responses to the settlor's agency
problem into nonprofit corporate law. This project is complicated by the
fact that the typical settlor is both a charity's founder and funder, whereas
these roles typically are split in a charitable corporation. Trust law parallel-
ism deals with this by offering a two-part answer to the "who is the princi-
pal" question. The donors of unrestricted gifts ("general donors") are the
preeminent "principals" as to a corporation's assets attributable to their
gifts, on par with donors of restricted gifts. The charitable trust doctrine
addresses these donors' agency problem vis-d-vis the directors-i.e., will
150. Sitkoff, supra note 92, at 624.
151. Brody, supra note 100, at 512.
152. Id.
153. Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in TIE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 472
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
154. But it is not. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 100, at 461 ("[W]hether society wants to privilege
donors with shareholder-like control is a normative question."); id. at 512 ("Who are the 'principals' to




the board use its assets attributable to unrestricted gifts for the charitable
objectives set forth in the articles of incorporation's statement of purposes
(or as manifested in the charity's operations) at the time their gifts were
accepted?
The corporate founder is the primary principal of the corporation as
such (i.e., independent of any gifts received), and her situation is analogous
to the settlor of a trust. The founder, like the settlor, sets forth her statement
of the charity's purposes in its organic document. 155 Trust law addresses
the settlor's agency problem vis-d-vis the trustee by obligating the trustee
to administer the trust "in a manner faithful to the expressed wishes of the
creator." 156 So too, the duty of obedience addresses the founder's agency
problem vis-A-vis the board.
The analogy between a trust's settlor and a corporate founder is plau-
sible. The archetypal settlor and archetypal founder (sometimes called a
"social entrepreneur"1 57) each endows her charity with distinctive re-
sources. The settlor contributes existing and definite interests in property,
such as land or stock that she presently owns. 158 The founder's most impor-
tant inputs, by contrast, are unlikely to constitute a "corpus" or "res" under
trust law. 159 These consist of the time, energy, and creativity she invests
into the enterprise, 160 and the opportunities she foregoes in doing so. Yet
the founder's contributions can be as vital to her enterprise's success as the
settlor's property is to the trust's. Over time, these inputs can ripen into
more conventional property interests. In a commercial nonprofit, for exam-
ple, this includes the corporation's value as a going concern. 161
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4 & cmt. a (1959) (summarizing what the phrase
"terms of the trust" comprises); ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § If-Il (defin-
ing "organic documents" to include "the articles of incorporation and bylaws of a nonprofit corpora-
tion"). Note that the founder's and general donors' charitable objectives are not identical if the
corporation was no longer advancing its original purposes when the general donors' gifts were received.
156. KURTZ, supra note 17, at 85 (citations omitted); accord FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 30,
at 230 (citation omitted); Sasso, supra note 65, at 1529.
157. See, e.g., PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY PRIMER 26-
27 (2002).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 74-76 (1957).
159. Id. § 74 ("A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property."). In most cases, the founder
also transfers at least some capital or other present property interests to the incorporating entity.
160. Id. § 74 cmt. b:
The knowledge or skill which a man possesses is not property- It is true that he can make
an agreement to communicate his knowledge and to exercise his skill, but such an agreement
is not a transfer of property and is binding only if the requirements for the formation of a con-
tract are complied with.
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "going-concern value" as "[t]he
value of a commercial enterprise's assets or of the enterprise itself as an active business with future
eaming power, as opposed to the liquidation value of the business or of its assets," and as including
"goodwill"). This value includes the enterprise's goodwill; id. at 715 (defining "goodwill" as "[al
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An analogy is not an argument. Trust law parallelism does not directly
explain why nonprofit corporate law should treat a charitable corporation's
founder and general donors as its principals. Rather, it evades the norma-
tive question by pushing it back a step: (a) it is self-evident that a settlor
ought to be deemed the trust's primary principal; (b) a founder and general
donors can be analogized to the settlor; (c) therefore, the founder and gen-
eral donors ought to be deemed the charitable corporation's primary princi-
pal. A normative argument can be made to support the first step in this
syllogism, as argued above. Unfortunately, trust law parallelism learns the
wrong lesson from that argument.
B. Trust Law Parallelism and the Informed Philanthropist
Part III of this Article argued that it is more efficient to offer grantors
a wider rather than narrower range of legal forms for making private gifts,
as this makes it more likely that each grantor will find a form whose default
rules fit her needs or preferences with a relatively small amount of tinker-
ing-thereby reducing her transaction costs. In practice, this means that
trust law's default rules should be very protective of a settlor's instruc-
tions-let trusts be trusts!-and so provide control-seeking grantors with a
giving mode tailored to their needs. The alternative approach-i.e., default
rules that weaken settlor control-would make trusts function more like
other (less settlor-protective) gift-giving modes. This would increase the
transaction costs of control-seeking grantors, without reducing the transac-
tion costs of more easygoing grantors. The overall effect likely would be to
reduce the total amount of giving. These same arguments counsel against
trust law parallelism, albeit from the perspective of philanthropists (defined
broadly to include charity founders, donors, and volunteers) who want don-
ees to have more control over their contributions.
Some philanthropists believe, reasonably so, that a charity's governing
body has more information about current charitable needs and new oppor-
tunities for generating more social benefits, as well as more expertise in
meeting such needs and exploiting such opportunities. They favor board
discretion insofar as this makes it easier to shift the charity's resources to
more socially valuable uses. 162 For the same reason, some philanthropists
favor broad statements of purposes in a charity's organic documents.
163
business's reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the
business, esp. for purchase; the ability to earn income in excess of the income that would be expected
from the business viewed as a mere collection of assets")-
162. See generally Triantis, supra note 29.
163. As Professor Triantis explains:
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Under corporate law parallelism, the default rules for charitable corpo-
rations grant boards of directors extensive discretion over the corporate
mission and general assets. These default rules more accurately reflect the
easygoing philanthropist's preferences as compared to a trust, and thus
reduce her costs of tailoring an off-the-rack legal form to fit her needs. If
these liberal default rules were replaced with more restrictive ones-i.e., a
robust duty of obedience (which demands that directors preserve a corpora-
tion's original purposes) and the charitable trust doctrine (which curbs the
board's discretion over unrestricted gifts)-then charitable corporations
would function more like charitable trusts. Instead of two distinct default
regimes for director discretion (restrictive trust law and permissive corpo-
rate law), trust law parallelism would give us two variations on the same
theme-restrictive trust law and somewhat less restrictive corporate law (or
trust law "lite").
Those who want more discretion for boards would have to spend more
time and money tailoring the available (and more restrictive) legal forms to
fit their more easygoing preferences. Moreover, trust law parallelism would
increase the easygoing philanthropists' transaction costs without signifi-
cantly reducing the transaction costs of philanthropists who want to curb
board discretion (because trust law already provides them with a set of
default rules that accomplish this). The end result of trust law parallelism is
to make it more costly for informed philanthropists to secure the form of
charitable governance they favor. This in turn may slow the total number of
charities formed and the growth of existing ones. The upshot is that we can
promote efficiency by letting charitable corporations be corporations-i.e.,
embrace corporate law parallelism.
C. Trust Law Parallelism and Uninformed Philanthropists
The informed philanthropist is one who, in the words of the Delaware
Supreme Court, "recognizes that different legal rules govern the operation
of charitable trusts and charitable corporations and selects a form with
those rules in mind."'164 A significant number of philanthropists, one sur-
[T]here may be good reasons for the existence of organizations that pursue multiple charitable
purposes. A broad organization may be justified by economies of scope in pursuing related
charitable projects that are not readily realized by contracts between corporations. A charity
may have specific information about a community that enables it to provide food, clothing,
education, and health care efficiently to the same beneficiaries. This information may not be
as effectively transmitted between even well-meaning separate organizations. Similarly, there
may be organizational or administrative economies in multipurpose charities.
Id. at 1150.
164. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466-67 (Del. 1991). The court was referring to charity organ-
izers, whom it assumes know the legal differences between charitable trusts and charitable corporations.
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mises, are uninformed or underinformed in this respect. Professor Brody
reports that "[i]n practice,... rarely does the founder of a charity carefully
consider the legal differences [between a charitable trust and a charitable
corporation] and make a choice based on the advantages of organizational
form."'1 65 Regrettably, a charity organizer may not learn much more from
some attorneys. Most U.S. lawyers recommend the corporate form to their
philanthropic clients,166 perhaps because more lawyers work with corpora-
tions than trusts. 167 Similarly, estate lawyers may steer their clients towards
trusts, a staple of their practice. 168 As a result, at least philanthropists
choose the corporate form without realizing that it grants the governing
body far more power over the mission and unrestricted gifts. 169 To use an
extreme example, those who form or fund a charitable corporation to shel-
ter abandoned animals probably do not know or expect that a future board
could or would convert the entity into an institute for vivisection re-
search. 170 This would never happen in a charitable trust.
How should the plight of the uninformed philanthropist affect our
choice of default rules for charitable corporations? The answer might turn
on what we know, believe, or guess a majority of such philanthropists
would have done if they had full information-i.e., if they knew the rele-
vant differences between charitable trusts and charitable corporations. 171
The idea here is that we can reduce transaction costs by setting default rules
to reflect what a majority would have wanted had they thought about it.172
Accordingly, the argument for more restrictive, trust law-like default rules
for charitable corporations would be stronger if, under such conditions, a
majority of charity organizers would have entrenched their specific charita-
ble purposes against tampering by the governing body. They could have
165. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REv. 1400, 1417 (1998). But
see Oberly, 592 A.2d at 467 (asserting that philanthropists understand the difference between a trust and
nonprofit corporation when they make their gifts, and when they use the corporate form, they "invoke[]
the far more flexible and adaptable principles of corporate law").
166. ALI, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No, 1, supra note 2, § 200 cmt. a.
167. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 30, at 63 ("A particular advantage of the nonprofit corpo-
rate form is that the governing statutes are comparable to state corporate law. This similarity offers a
familiar model to a nonprofit corporation's legal counsel as well as a body of analogous case law that
often can be transported to the nonprofit context.").
168. ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, mem. at 4.
169. Conversely, some philanthropists may choose the trust form even though it gives trustees less
flexibility over the mission than they would like, if asked.
170. See Attorney General v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 n.18 (Mass. 1986).
171. Alternatively, we can ask what terms the philanthropists and the donee charity would have
bargained for if they had full information and low negotiation costs. But see Sitkoff, supra note 92, at
644 n. 109 (noting assertions that, in the context of private donative trusts, "settlors simply do not dicker
with trustees"),
172. Id. at 644 (citations omitted).
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done this either by selecting the trust form or, if they chose the corporate
form, by including certain provisions in the corporation's articles of incor-
poration, such as: prohibiting the board from changing the original charita-
ble purposes without first determining that these had failed or been
fulfilled; 73 requiring a supermajority of board members to change the
charitable purposes; prohibiting the board from changing the charitable
purposes; or requiring any amendment to the charitable purposes to be
approved by some party other than the board. 174 Similarly, it would
strengthen the argument for more trust law-like default rules for unrestric-
tive gifts if, under such conditions, a majority of general donors would
have imposed restrictions on the use of their gifts-for example, by prohib-
iting the charity from using their gifts for any purpose other than those set
forth in the charity's statement of purposes when it received their gifts.
Conversely, the case for the status quo would be stronger if a majority
would have chosen it.
We do not know the answer to this question. In the face of such uncer-
tainty, common sense suggests that we pick the default rule that generates
more social benefits than the altemative(s). All things being equal, it is
more efficient to permit a charity's governing body to redirect its charitable
mission and assets. Because a living hand can respond to unforeseen
changes, act upon new information, and exploit new opportunities, more
discretion for the governing body facilitates the use of the charity's re-
sources in ways that benefit society more than do the uses selected by the
charity organizer or past donors.
Yet even if we know that a majority of uninformed philanthropists
would have wanted more trust law-like default rules for charitable corpora-
tions, this is not the last word. Default rules can advance policies other than
(or in addition to) reducing the transaction costs of making various ar-
rangements. The laws of intestacy, for example, typically put the surviving
spouse and descendants at the front of the line to inherit the decedent's
estate. 175 If there are no descendents, the estate may be divided between the
surviving spouse and the decedent's parents.176 Whether or not these rules
173. The ALI Council Draft expressly rejects this provision as a default rule. See ALl, Nonprofit
Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 240(c)(1).
174. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-17-17-1 (2005).
175. See, e.g., id. § 29-1-2-1(b)(l) ("[T]he surviving spouse shall receive... [o]nc-half (1/2) of the
net estate if the intestate is survived by at least one (I) child or by the issue of at least one (1) deceased
child."); id. § 29-1-2-1(d)(1) ("The share of the net estate not distributable to the surviving spouse, or
the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse, shall descend and be distribute ... [t]o the issue of
the intestate.").
176. See, e.g., id. § 29-1-2-1(b)(2) ("[T]he surviving spouse shall receive -- [t]hree-fourths (3/4)
of the net estate, if there is no surviving issue, but the intestate is survived by one (1) or both of the
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effectuate the (unexpressed) wishes of most intestates, they direct the dece-
dent's assets to those people in his circle who are most likely to become
destitute without them. These rules thus protect the public fisc by reducing
the number of financially vulnerable people requiring public support.
Similarly, we can define the default rules for charitable corporations in
ways we hope will do more for society than simply reduce the transaction
costs of philanthropists (or compensate for the lost gifts due to the increase
in such transaction costs). Rigid adherence to a charity's original mission
or a charitable gift's original terms is, in the long run, likely to frustrate the
rational and efficient use of these resources. 177 The trick is how to peel
charitable assets from the dead hands of philanthropists without discourag-
ing living persons from becoming philanthropists. Insofar as this is possi-
ble, it is probably more readily accomplished against charitable
corporations created by, as well as unrestricted gifts donated by, unin-
formed philanthropists. If these philanthropists were uninformed when they
selected the corporate form or made an unrestricted gift, there is a decent
chance that they will stay uninformed, and theoretically what they do not
know cannot hurt them.
There are risks to setting a default rule at odds with what a (hypotheti-
cal) majority would have chosen. When previously uninformed contribu-
tors learn about the rule, they may be very angry--especially if a charity
exercised its lawful discretion over its mission, assets, or both in ways that
the donor did not actually intend and would not have approved. This is
apparently what happened after 9/11, when many people became famously
outraged over the American Red Cross's initial plan to use some Liberty
Fund ("Fund") donations for purposes not directly related to 9/11 relief.178
This outrage was not abated by the facts that (a) most donors to the Fund
did not expressly restrict their gifts to 9/11 relief and (b) the Fund's organic
document stated that its moneys would be used for numerous purposes,
such as creating a reserve for responding to future attacks involving weap-
ons of mass destruction. 179 Because of the American Red Cross's high
visibility in 9/11 relief, the controversy surrounding the Liberty Fund tem-
intestate's parents."); id § 29-1-2-1(d)(2) ("If there is a surviving spouse but no surviving issue of the
intestate, then [the share of the net estate not distributable to the surviving spouse shall descend and be
distributed] to the surviving parents of the intestate.").
177. ALl, Nonprofit Law, Council Draft No. 1, supra note 2, § 240 rptr's note 10; POSNER, supra
note 146, at 556-57.
178. See Katz, supra note 40, at 306-14 (discussing the American Red Cross's response to 9/11).




porarily may have dissuaded some people from contributing to any
charity.
180
These risks are real, but the better way to handle them is to let each
charity decide how to exercise its discretion and how much it wishes to tell
potential donors about the lawful range (or self-imposed limits) of its dis-
cretion. This gives most charitable corporations more discretion in more
cases, to society's gain, while putting the burden on each charity to decide
when the harms of exercising their discretion outweigh the benefits. For
example, after its unpleasant experience with the Liberty Fund, the Ameri-
can Red Cross rewrote its solicitation materials to clarify its multipurpose
use of unrestricted gifts to its general disaster relief fund.18 1 It also under-
took to contact each donor of an unrestricted gift to ensure that all donors
understand the scope of the charity's discretion on how to use their gift. 1
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CONCLUSION
When viewed in isolation, corporate law parallelism-the policy of
modeling nonprofit corporate law after for-profit corporate law-seems to
aggravate concerns about mission accountability in charitable corporations,
an alleged problem to which trust law parallelism may seem an antidote. A
broader perspective, however, underscores in two respects the wisdom of
the default rules that grant expansive discretion to the boards of charitable
corporations. First, by accentuating the legal differences between charitable
corporations and charitable trusts, we can reduce the transaction costs of
informed philanthropists who prefer to start and support charities whose
governing bodies have extensive discretion over the objectives and assets.
By reducing the transaction costs of engaging in charitable activity, we
thereby can increase the total volume of such activity-to society's better-
ment. Second, a policy of corporate law parallelism can increase the effi-
cacy of charitable resources. Many unsophisticated or uninformed
philanthropists will start and support charitable corporations, even though
they would prefer to curb a charity's governing board's control over its
objectives and assets, and even though with fuller information they would
have chosen to start and support charitable trusts (which we have seen are
not as likely to maximize their benefit to society as are charitable corpora-
180. See Triantis, supra note 29, at 1151 & n.159 ("A year afler the attack, a poll found that
twenty-nine percent of Americans surveyed were less likely to donate to any charity because of the
attempted diversion of donations dedicated to 9/11 relief efforts.") (citing a poll conducted by Harris
Interactive for The Chronicle of Philanthropy).
181. See Katz, supra note 40, at 315-16.
182. Id.
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tions). By increasing the number of charities and volume of charitable as-
sets overseen by boards with extensive discretion, corporate law parallel-
ism facilitates the application of these charities' resources to more socially
beneficial uses.

